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Abstract: 
 
Big data is opening new angles on old questions about scientific progress. Is scientific 
knowledge cumulative? If yes, how does it make progress? In the life sciences, what we call the 
Consensus Principle has dominated the design of data discovery and integration tools: the design 
of a formal classificatory system for expressing a body of data should be grounded in consensus. 
Based on current approaches in biomedicine and systematic biology, we formulate and compare 
three types of the Consensus Principle: realist, contextual-best, and coordinative. Contrasted with 
the realist program of the Open Biomedical Ontologies Foundry, we argue that historical 
practices in systematic biology provide an important and overlooked alternative based on 
coordinative consensus. Systematists have developed a robust system for referring to taxonomic 
entities that can deliver high quality data discovery and integration without invoking consensus 
about reality or “settled” science.  
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The possibility of a theory-neutral language for expressing empirical data has been an 
enduring question for philosophy of science (Kuhn 1996). Without a theoretical paradigm to 
guide the collection and interpretation of facts, science cannot get started — one simply acquires 
an ever-larger cabinet of curiosities. The very need for theory to make data meaningful, though, 
threatens the longevity of what we take to be scientific knowledge at any given time: new 
discoveries may always overthrow existing theory and render old investigations irrelevant. Big 
data is opening new perspectives on old questions like this one by deepening the theoretical 
foundations underpinning scientists’ ability to find and use data as scientific evidence. Managing 
unprecedented magnitudes of data has forced scientists to articulate new conceptual assumptions 
and establish new social norms and organizations, leading to a period of increased reflective 
awareness of the central role that data play in science (Leonelli 2016). These changing 
circumstances provide an opportunity for integrative research centered on revitalized questions 
about the prerequisites for scientific progress: what epistemic principles should guide the design 
of computational systems to enable the accumulation and meaningful use of data over time?  
New answers are emerging to this question, but their precise scope, content, and relative 
merits are still unclear (Leonelli 2016; Sterner and Franz 2017; Franz and Sterner 2018). In the 
life sciences, what we will call the Consensus Principle (CP) has dominated the design of data 
discovery and integration tools:  
(CP) The design of a formal classificatory system for expressing a body of 
data should be grounded in consensus. 
We present three distinct versions of CP as a normative guide to designing data discovery and 
integration systems (Table 1). No single version presently seems adequate to the broader task of 
ensuring the cumulativeness of scientific knowledge over time, but considered jointly they 
provide the groundwork for a comparative study of the relative merits and trade-offs of each 
approach in concrete cases. We see this as a starting point for developing a robust information 
science perspective on formalized vocabularies for data discovery and integration. Data-centric 
biology thus represents an excellent opportunity for clarifying and operationalizing fundamental 
principles for the design of data infrastructure, especially classificatory theories, in order to 
provide empirical evidence for their performance. 
The most visible formulation of CP in the life sciences has been Barry Smith and Werner 
Ceuster’s “ontological realist” view, which has had an important influence on the adoption of 
computer ontologies into the biomedical sciences through the founding of the Open Biological 
and Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry (Smith et al. 2007; Arp, Smith, and Spear 2015). 
Smith and Ceuster’s realist conception of CP asserts that our classificatory theories of data 
should be grounded on consensus about nature in order to harnessing maximal efficiences of 
scale from computational processing. We suggest that while it presents a principled and well-
ordered approach to ontology-building, scientific practice often calls for less restrictive and more 
flexible design principles.  
Many contemporary ontologies that are endorsed by biologists depart from Smith and 
Ceuster’s approach in adopting a weakened version of CP that only requires consensus on 
principles determining what is the “best” ontology for a body of data, but which permits the 
meaning of “best” to vary by context (Lord and Stevens 2010; Maojo et al. 2011; Sojic and Kutz 
2012; Hoehndorf, Dumontier, and Gkoutos 2013; Franz and Goldstein 2013). While still 
consensus-based, these scientists’ practices are not organized under an equivalently systematic 
and far-reaching theory of ontology design. 
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In contrast with the realist and contextual-best types of CP, we argue that historical 
practices in systematic biology provide an important and overlooked alternative based on 
coordinative consensus. This is a blind spot worth addressing, since systematists have honed an 
approach to data discovery and integration that departs in crucial ways from both realist and 
contextual design stances. Many areas of systematics continue to experience rapid change in, and 
dissent over, the meaning of classificatory terms. As a result, design principles that rely on 
consensus-building over the meaning of terms – whether grounded on realist or epistemic 
principles – have been of little service to the systematic research community. And yet, seemingly 
paradoxically, this hasn’t precluded biologists from building classificatory systems based on the 
consensus principle. The key to their consensus-based solution has two parts. First, taxonomists 
use nomenclatural codes to govern the application of classificatory terms (i.e. taxonomic names) 
to taxonomic hypotheses, rather than specifying the meanings of those terms. Second, 
taxonomists follow the convention of including diagnostic criteria in the definitions of taxonomic 
names so as to enable the identification of new specimens. Together, these practices permit 
reliable translation of data across conflicting classifications. 
Until recently, biologists have primarily used this system for coordinating the use of 
taxonomic names in human communication and reasoning, and they now face the challenge of 
formalizing and implementing this approach in a computational setting. We argue that shared 
principles for coordination rather than shared meaning does provide a sufficient foundation for a 
principled approach to designing computational data integration systems. 
 
A comparative approach to big data trajectories 
 
Every subfield of the life sciences appears to be leveraging big data in some fashion, 
from omics to biodiversity science. Sterner and Franz (2017) have described these instances of 
big data efforts as tracing out multiple “big data trajectories” over time that we can compare and 
analyze in order to arrive at deeper understanding of the role data plays in driving scientific 
change.1 They define a big data trajectory as consisting of the activities of a group of researchers 
who (1) set out to expand the collective set of data available to address one or more shared 
problems of interest in such a way that (2) the researchers believe existing methods or resources 
available to the group are not adequate for the project and (3) they believe acquiring these 
methods or resources poses specific research problems separate from the original problems of 
shared interest” (Sterner and Franz 2017, 100). From an observer’s perspective, one can now 
watch what happens as the big data movement plays out in different communities and evaluate 
how well it delivers on people’s expectations. This provides us with a rich set of opportunities 
for comparative study as biologists begin to articulate lessons learned from their local 
experiences and apply them to new situations.  
Looking ahead, a key issue will be how far the principles that scientists formulate for data 
discovery and integration in their local domains extend to other areas of science. A one-size-fits-
all approach cannot be assumed and arguably should not be expected. Indeed, using our 
                                               
1 Our notion of a big data trajectory is distinct from Sabina Leonelli’s concept of data journeys, 
although they are connected in important ways. Briefly, Leonelli uses journey to evoke how data 
travel across time and place from their original situations of production to new situations of use. 
In contrast, the idea of a big data trajectory is meant to describe the progress a scientific 
community makes as a function of increasing the amount of data available for a problem. 
 4 
comparative perspective on big data trajectories will we show that different knowledge domains 
and scientific practices call for different solutions to the circulation of data between research 
sites. 
In particular, we will focus on the underlying epistemological principles scientists use to 
warrant their choice of data classifications. Based on several case studies (Agar 2006), it appears 
that successful computerization of scientific work follows a general pattern: computers are first 
adopted to automate modular subtasks in a larger activity and then subsequently used to re-
imagine the organization of work used to complete the activity as a whole. Agar’s analysis 
highlights the special importance of analyzing the arguments people use to support the claim that 
adopting computer technology requires significant changes to historical practices. More broadly, 
this provides us with an analytical framework for computerization as an institutional process by 
which a group of individuals set out to make the use of computer technology indispensable for 
specific activities (Sterner and Lidgard 2014; Sterner and Lidgard 2018). The consensus 
principle in its different formulations serves as a normative, methodological resource for 
regulating scientists’ practices for computerization projects. Clarifying its use and justification is 
therefore crucial to understanding broader landscape of what scientists mean by “data” (Leonelli 
2016; Sterner 2018). 
In this context, formalizing the languages that biologists use to describe their data has 
become increasingly important. Building a dictionary, glossary, or thesaurus for experts is not 
generally sufficient to make the leap from human to computer intelligibility: the definitions and 
semantic relations provided by the dictionary and thesaurus still fundamentally operate in a 
natural language setting where logical imprecisions and errors do not propagate via deductive 
inference into horribly wrong conclusions (Sterner and Franz 2017). “Dictionaries are prepared 
for human beings; their merely nominal definitions can employ the unregimented resources of 
natural language, can tolerate circularities and all manner of idiosyncrasy. In ontologies, 
however, definitions must be regimented in such a way that each reflects the position in the 
hierarchy to which the definiendum belongs” (Smith 2005, 15). Although colored by specific 
views about definition (see below), this quote captures the way that bringing computers into 
biologists’ practices of representing and reasoning about biological data begins to transform the 
underlying language and use of data. These formalized systems for expressing data are 
classificatory theories that deserve philosophical analysis and criticism as much as other more 
traditional theories such as quantum mechanics or evolutionary theory (Leonelli 2016). 
These classificatory theories serve at least two important functions for biology: data 
discovery and integration. Data discovery relies on searchable metadata to return datasets with 
high precision and recall (Remsen 2016). For example, the Global Biodiversity Information 
Facility’s data portal enables one to query aggregated specimen and occurrence data using search 
terms such as the taxonomic name “Hirundo rustica.” In contrast, data integration goes beyond 
discovery to combine data of different types or sources, often to provide input for a predictive 
model. For example, one could use the Gene Ontology to integrate data on the subcellular 
location of gene products with assay data on gene expression levels. Another example is to 
integrate data on molecular interactions across several species in order to annotate genes with 
predicted interactions or functions (Leonelli 2013). 
Translating what data mean for human experts into forms that are intelligible to 
computers is therefore a fundamental challenge for data science. Observations and experimental 
results don’t tell their own story: understanding their full significance requires contextualization 
in light of local aims, resources, analytical methods, and error repertoires (Leonelli 2016). 
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Human experts reliably integrate implicit knowledge and explicit standards to navigate subtle 
shifts in the meaning of data from one situation to the next. Computers, in contrast, are usually 
stuck playing the role of naïve reader to human discourse and thought. As more and more 
disciplines have embraced big data projects, scientists have encountered recurring obstacles in 
defining, preserving, and sharing the new information they are collecting, forcing a new level of 
reflective awareness about the nature and significance of data (Leonelli 2016; Millerand et al. 
2013; Bowker 2000). 
 
A realist view of the consensus principle 
 
The general consensus principle we introduced above states that the design of a formal 
system for expressing a body of data should be grounded in consensus. The central question we 
examine in the remainder of the paper is the ideal nature of that common system. In this section, 
we look at pioneering work by Smith and Ceusters in the 2000s that introduced “ontological 
realism” as one solution (e.g. Smith 2004). Their approach endorses what we can call the realist 
consensus principle for ontologies:  
Realist Consensus Principle (RCP): The design of a formal 
classificatory system for expressing a body of data should be grounded in 
a global consensus metaphysical interpretation of the reality those data 
describe.  
According to Smith and Ceusters, that consensus metaphysical interpretation includes the reality 
of universals, although in later works they provide a more flexible view we will come back to 
below (Smith 2004; Smith 2005; Smith 2008a; Arp, Smith, and Spear 2015).  
 The need for an interpretation of the logical system highlights a fundamental point that 
extends to all computer-facilitated data integration approaches in use today. The basic logical 
structures that comprise any computer ontology are classes, individuals, and properties.2 
Relations can be between classes (e.g. class “X” is a class “Y”), between individuals and classes 
(individual “A” instantiates class “B”), and between individuals (individual “A” is the father of 
individual “B”). As the three examples show, ontologies can also specify classes of relations, 
such as “is the father of” or “is a part of.”  
Most frequently, computer ontologies instantiate some version of description logic which 
uses a restricted syntax compared to first-order logic in order to improve computational 
efficiency. The precise details aren’t relevant for our purposes (see Baader et al. 2003; Keet 
2018). For practical use, any type of description logic is further implemented in some 
standardized machine-readable syntax such as the OWL2 Web Ontology Language. The main 
point is that adhering to the abstract axioms of a description logic is not sufficient to guarantee 
that computer ontologies will be useful for data discovery and integration. Neither is following 
the standardized syntactic rules governing any implementation like OWL. None of these 
underlying resources determines a coherent semantics able to regulate the definition and 
interpretation of terms in the ontology such that they can be combined to form useful 
representations of biological data. This point is analogous to the distinction between syntactic 
and semantic views of scientific theories in philosophy of science (Winther 2015). 
For simplicity, we treat Smith and Ceuster’s ontological realism as containing two main 
elements: (1) an ontology called the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), which is foundational for all 
                                               
2 We use terminology common to OWL here since it is the easiest to grasp intuitively, but researchers in the first-
order logic and description logic communities use different terms for operationally equivalent ideas. 
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other bio-ontologies, and (2) a realist interpretation of the structures in an ontology. Their work 
also contains a number of supplementary guidelines that we do not discuss here. 
 The world of ontological realism has two types of entities: universals and particulars. 
Examples of universals include human being, enzyme, aspirin, and examples of particulars are 
you and me, the Planet Earth, this piece of cheese (Smith 2005). Smith and Ceusters give 
different general characterizations of universals and particulars in different papers, though see 
(Merrill 2010b). For example, in Smith (2005), universals are multiply located entities that exist 
in particulars, while particulars are entities with only one location in space at a time. In Smith 
and Ceusters (2010), they characterize universals as repeatable, i.e. as having potentially 
indefinitely many instances we can discover in principle. Smith also proposes that universals are 
distinguished from mere extensional sets by figuring in scientific laws of nature or having real 
definitions rather than nominal definitions (Smith 2005). Hence ontologies can include terms for 
what Smith calls “collections,” which are sets formed from logical combinations of universals, 
but these collections are treated as artificial constructs rather than real entities in the world. In 
this manner, ontological realism aims to put a realist semantic interpretation on the basic 
syntactic structures of first-order logic. Things that can have predicates thus include universals as 
well as particulars. Smith also adds a further logical primitive, the instantiation relation, and 
stipulates that only particulars can instantiate universals (Smith 2005).   
 Two additional features of Smith and Ceuster’s realist interpretation concern the ideal 
form of definitions for terms and the possibility of overlap in the domains of ontologies. As 
noted, ontological realism privileges real definitions over nominal ones, with the goal being to 
formulate necessary and sufficient conditions describing the essence of the universal. Ideally, 
this should take the form of Aristotelian differentia in a hierarchy of logical species and genera, 
i.e. species A is genus B with differentiating criterion C. In the Foundational Model for 
Anatomy, for instance, we can find Cell defined as “Anatomical structure, each instance of 
which has as its boundary the external surface of some maximally connected plasma membrane” 
(2018a). Smith and Ceusters also take an Aristotelian view of nature in the sense that they 
support the value of multiple ontological perspectives, so that a single domain can be described 
by ontologies that partition phenomena in different ways (Smith 2008a). As a result, ontological 
realism does not necessarily imply eliminative reductionism, e.g. about the reality of organisms 
in favor of molecules. 
 However, the second element of ontological realism does enforce consistency with one 
fundamental ontology, BFO (Arp, Smith, and Spear 2015). In tension with the claim to realism, 
BFO provides a set of metaphysically fundamental terms that are roughly consistent with a 
common sense view of the world as “midsize dry goods” consistent with Newtonian mechanics 
(Lord and Stevens 2010). For example, BFO distinguishes between continuants, entities that only 
have spatial parts, and occurrents, entities which can have parts that extend in space as well as 
time. On this view, a cat is a continuant: its legs are parts of it at a given time, for instance, but 
its legs ten minutes ago are not part of it now. The cat walking, in contrast, is an occurrent 
because each step it takes forms a temporal part of the event as a whole. BFO also distinguishes 
between independent and dependent entities, which refers narrowly to whether a type of 
particular can only exist if a particular of another type also exists. The quality blue, for example, 
is dependent because it can only exist as a property of some actual object. To be consistent with 
ontological realism, any other ontology should at least define its universals in terms of the 
primitives provided by BFO using Aristotelian differentia. BFO therefore plays an important role 
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for ontological realism in harmonizing the design of ontologies across diverse subject domains 
(Smith et al. 2007). 
 In general, the guiding slogan of ontological realism is to “describe what exists in reality, 
not what is known about what exists in reality” (Arp, Smith, and Spear 2015). In the early 2000s, 
Smith and Ceusters demonstrated a number of cases where existing terminologies failed to keep 
these separate, leading to basic reasoning flaws (Kumar and Smith 2003; Ceusters, Smith, and 
Goldberg 2005; Smith et al. 2005; Smith and Ceusters 2006). The underlying idea is 
straightforward enough: without a single, coherent semantics, ontologies can equivocate between 
referring to things in nature and things in our minds, such as beliefs and concepts. Consider a 
hypothetical scenario where “gene” is defined as “a concept used by biologists to denote coding 
regions of DNA” and “regulatory region” is defined as “a segment of DNA upstream of a coding 
region.” Any instance of a gene is then a token concept, but any instance of a regulatory region is 
a token DNA molecule. If the ontology also includes the relation “regulatory region is part of 
gene,” then observations associated with a particular regulatory region could be inferred to also 
be true of the associated gene concept. For ontologies with thousands of terms and many more 
individuals, this semantic slippage can easily lead to flawed search query results or datasets. 
 
Historical interlude: deflating ontological realism 
 
In 2010, Gary Merrill did for ontological realism more or less what Arthur Fine did for the 
realism debate in 1986. In The Shaky Game, Arthur Fine delivered a series of powerful critiques 
questioning the value of any interpretation, metaphysical or epistemic, that philosophers could 
add on top of the success of science (Fine 2009). Metaphysical interpretations based on inference 
to the best explanation do not provide a more secure foundation for science, for example, and in 
any case an anti-realist can substitute “reliable” for “true” in a metaphysical theory and get the 
same result. In contrast, Smith and Ceusters have consistently claimed that interpreting first-
order logic in terms of universals leads to better results for ontology design (Smith 2004; Smith 
2008a; Smith and Ceusters 2010), in contrast to a cluster of views they grouped under the label 
of “conceptualism.” Merill’s (2010b) critiques led to a broader discussion in the community, 
however, which illustrated a more expansive range of alternatives than Smith and Ceusters 
allowed. One effect of the discussion for scientists was to emphasize the need for clear 
evaluative criteria for ontologies that could connect fundamental design principles to empirical 
evidence. 
In general, Smith and Ceusters have framed scientists’ choice of approach as a stark 
opposition between ontological realism and conceptualism, which holds that words refer only to 
concepts, not the world. Smith and Ceusters moreover cast many pre-existing efforts at 
regulating scientific terminology as firmly in the conceptualist camp. Describing early versions 
of the SNOMED terminology and the Gene Ontology in 2008, Smith wrote: “Unfortunately, the 
new formalized biomedical terminologies were developed against the background of what are 
now coming to be recognized as a series of major and minor philosophical errors. Very roughly, 
the developers of terminologies made the assumption that we cannot have knowledge of the real 
world, but only of our thoughts. Therefore, they inferred, it is thoughts to which our terms (and 
our terminologies) necessarily refer” (Smith 2008b, 83).  
In his 2010 critiques, Merrill sought to undermine the relevance of Smith and Ceuster’s 
distinction between ontological realism and conceptualism by deflating the significance of 
believing in the reality of universals (or analogous ideas such as natural kinds, types, etc.) for 
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scientific practice. In particular, he argued that Smith and Ceusters offered no way to 
operationalize the claim that ontologies should only include classes that were interpretable as 
universals.3 On the other hand, Merrill also resisted being cast as a conceptualist — his main 
point was that these philosophical interpretations of the syntax of description logic were not 
contributing anything substantive to science. “The alternative to adopting a metaphysically based 
realist principle in science is not to adopt a metaphysical non-realist principle.  It is rather not to 
adopt a metaphysical principle at all” (Miscellaneous authors 2010). Or, to borrow Fine’s 
language from the realism debate, ontological realism was an “artificial additive” to the practice 
of building bio-ontologies.  
Merrill’s critique sparked a back-and-forth with Smith and Ceusters in print (Smith and 
Ceusters 2010; Merrill 2010a), as well as an extended discussion in the OBO Foundry’s public e-
mail discussion list (Miscellaneous authors 2010). This more informal discussion made 
especially clear the extent of the confusion and disagreement about ontological realism that 
existed among scientists building bio-ontologies. While the debate earned a lot of attention, it 
does not seem to have settled much except the need for more clarity on best practices. Michel 
Dumontier, for example, summed things up as follows:  
“There are two issues I’d like to raise to our communities: 1 - What metrics 
should we use to assess ontology quality and determine whether an ontology is 
‘good’. 2 - Can we re-factor existing, and well used terminologies… into ‘good’ 
ontologies for health care and the life sciences?” {Miscellaneousauthors:2010tj 
Jul 27, 2010; 9:16am. 
Several participants in the OBO Foundry discussion also went on to publish more formal 
critiques of ontological realism as a practical guide to ontology design (Lord and Stevens 
2010; Maojo et al. 2011; Sojic and Kutz 2012; Hoehndorf, Dumontier, and Gkoutos 
2013). 
There are thus a number of outstanding problems in this arena with considerable 
relevance for both philosophy and biology. A partial list would include: (1) How can ontological 
realism be operationalized in order to provide clear evidence of its impact on design choices? (2) 
Can ontological realism be extended to provide systematic guidance about instrumental aspects 
of scientific modeling, including the use of fictions, idealizations, and other practical expedients? 
(3) To what extent are uniform semantics really necessary for optimal data discovery and 
integration using ontologies? (4) What alternatives are there to ontological realism? It’s to this 
last question that we will turn in the remainder of the paper. 
 
A contextualist view of the consensus principle 
 
While Smith and Cuesters have had important influence on bio-ontologies, especially in 
the 2000s, the broader community does not adhere strictly to the details of ontological realism. 
The well-established Drosophila anatomy ontology, for example, takes a pragmatic approach to 
inheritance hierarchies, permitting multiple inheritance in some cases, and also accommodates 
visual as well as textual definitions (Costa et al. 2013). Alternatively, while Arp, Smith, and 
Spear (2015) take species to be paradigm examples of universals, other biologists have strongly 
disputed this claim (Franz and Thau 2010). Moroever, the widely-used NCBI taxonomy ontology 
is a bare hierarchy of taxonomic names with no definitions that is automatically generated from 
                                               
3 This is related to the problem logical empiricists faced when they tried to define qualitative predicates (Goodman 
1983). 
 9 
other name databases (Federhen 2012; 2018b). Do biologists follow a coherent, systematic 
alternative to ontological realism in practice? We provide a preliminary answer here, though 
considerably more research is needed for a full accounting of what biologists actually do when 
building and revising their ontologies. 
We propose that many practices of ontology-building in the biomedical domain are better 
characterized as employing design principles that are adapted to the particularities of scientific 
practice in their respective domains. This approach to ontology-building departs from the RCP 
by substituting local principles about what constitutes the best meanings for scientific concepts 
for a shared view of reality as the consensus criterion. We call this the contextual-best consensus 
principle for ontology-building: 
Contextual-Best Consensus Principle (CBCP): The design of a formal 
classificatory system for expressing a body of data should be grounded in 
a local consensus on principles for evaluating the quality of a definition.  
This version of the consensus principle is contextual because each community designing an 
ontology must decide on which design principles are best. However, the CBCP still commits 
scientists to agreeing on substantive and general criteria that govern how they define terms in 
that ontology.  
These criteria could rest on a particular metaphysical theory of their subject domain, as 
required by ontological realism, but can also be grounded in epistemic principles which, for 
example, characterize what counts as mature or settled science. As of September, 2018, the OBO 
Foundry principle for ontology maintenance states:  
“Tentatively, we consider scientific consensus to be reached if multiple 
publications by independent labs over a year come to the same conclusion, and 
there is no or limited (<10%) dissenting opinions published in the same time 
frame. In cases an area remains controversial, and no consensus is reached, then it 
is up to the ontology maintainer to either leave out the controversial term, or pick 
a viewpoint for practical considerations, and note the presence of controversy in 
an editor note” (The OBO Foundry 2018).  
Apart from having an important say over what terms an ontology includes, ontology 
maintainers often play a crucial role in facilitating integration by creating lists of synonyms for 
terms that feature in an ontology. Where different research communities use different terms to 
refer to the same process or components, an ontology can bring these into contact by making 
new data available under familiar terms. However, this does call for expert judgment on part of 
the maintainer. Subtle differences in meaning or contextualized associations of a term might get 
lost in the translation process and can introduce unwarranted implications. 
Another example is the choice among entomologists building the Hymenoptera Anatomy 
Ontology (HAO) not to use evolutionary homologies (Yoder et al. 2010; Seltmann, Austin, and 
Jennings 2012). In this case, the biologists argue that claims about evolutionary homologies are 
generally so uncertain and liable to change that they should be categorically excluded as classes 
in the ontology. We quote an extended excerpt here because it nicely illustrates how consensus 
views about best design can rest on context-dependent features of scientific knowledge: 
“Fundamentally, the HAO project rests on recognizing different instances of a 
topographically-defined concept as “the same”… The HAO employs the principle 
of “structural equivalence” to discuss topographical sameness. In biology, 
however, homology is often more explicit, referring to a more profound 
“sameness”, because it expresses a theory about structures sharing a common 
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evolutionary origin even if they appear structurally dissimilar… Homology in this 
evolutionary context is often dynamic, and may be controversial or involve 
conflicting hypotheses or quickly changing views. The dynamic nature of 
homology hypotheses conflicts with the HAO’s goal of unambiguous 
circumscription of anatomical concepts, and, as such, overt reference to homology 
hypotheses are avoided in constructing HAO definitions” (Seltmann, Austin, and 
Jennings 2012, 79). 
Although the authors recognize evolutionary homology as more fundamental, particular 
homology claims are often far from counting as “settled” science on any view. Rather than 
attempt to represent that uncertainty and conflict explicitly, the HAO designers move wholesale 
to structural equivalence as the basis for classifying data about anatomy.4  
Ontological realism as well as the two contextualist examples use “settled” science as a 
basis for regulating the content of ontologies. Ontological realism characterizes settled science as 
approximately true to nature, while the OBO Foundry provides a more operational though ad hoc 
characterization in terms of number of confirming papers. As foundations for the continuity of 
scientific knowledge, then, ontologies under these approaches take current consensus as the best 
guide to future stability. As existing bio-ontologies accumulate more history, however, 
interesting complications are beginning to emerge as scientists introduce changes and align these 
to past versions (Bertone et al. 2013; Pesquita et al. 2013; Otero-Cerdeira, Rodríguez-Martínez, 
and Gómez-Rodríguez 2015). The history of science teaches us to be cautious about 
guaranteeing that any one aspect of scientific knowledge will stay constant over time, so it is 
worth exploring how much continuity is possible even in extreme cases of disagreement. This is 
one way in which systematic biology has important lessons for data science today. 
 
Consensus in the face of lasting dissent 
  
The diversity of life on Earth continues to challenge our understanding of the nature of 
taxonomic units and the best methods for studying them. The classification of biodiversity is one 
of the greatest challenges in biology in several ways: we have yet to discover much of the 
biodiversity on the planet, many known species have received only minimal attention so far, and 
biological species are some of the most complex phenomena we know. No consensus exists in 
systematics on the correct metaphysical nature of biological species (Wilkins 2009), nor is there 
one evidential standard that everyone can agree to follow when delimiting species boundaries 
(Conix 2018). Systematists are also often confronted with incomplete and conflicting data about 
taxa, and as a result many species classifications are best understood as ongoing research 
hypotheses rather than “settled” science. In these circumstances, ongoing instability and 
disagreements about the correct way to classify a taxonomic group are both expected and 
desirable, given that biologists continue to publish new empirical evidence and analyses (Franz 
and Thau 2010). 
Nonetheless, taxonomic names and definitions are absolutely fundamental to 
understanding the biological significance of all data in the life sciences (Remsen 2016). In some 
taxonomic groups, biologists can rely on nomenclatural databases that assert a single coherent 
                                               
4 This empiricist concern about the theory-dependence of anatomical data has parallels to the earlier disputes 
between pheneticists, cladists, and evolutionary systematists about the best methodology for inferring classifications 
(Hull 1988; Sterner and Lidgard 2018), and would be a fruitful point of contact between philosophical analyses of 
homology and scientific practice. 
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classification system based on the judgment of one or more experts, e.g. the WoRMS database 
for fish (Costello et al. 2013). The present views of one or a few experts, however, are often 
unstable across the broader community of biologists as well as over time. In the largest analysis 
to date of 151 different taxonomic treatments of birds published from 1886 to 2014, only 11 of 
the 19,260 unique combinations (0.06%) of species names and taxonomic meanings were used 
consistently by all authorities (Lepage, Vaidya, and Guralnick 2014). In another analysis of two 
highly cited treatment versions that review primate taxonomy, published by the same author and 
separated by merely 12 years, one in three taxonomic names changed either their syntax, or their 
meaning, or both (Franz, Pier, et al. 2016). In either case, reconciling the remaining 33.0-99.9% 
of name usages requires some form of additional human processing, repeatedly, and in principle 
indefinitely  
Assuming or imposing consensus views on the meanings of taxonomic names for the 
purpose of aggregating specimen and occurrence data also places a performance ceiling on data 
discovery and integration. Providing lists of synonyms – which we mentioned are often included 
in ontologies in the biomedical domain – does not address the complexity of the problem 
systematists face. They have not merely been looking for means to highlight many-to-one 
relationships between names and a known entity they refer to, but instead have to deal with 
many-to-many relationships between names and different (unsettled) hypotheses about the 
circumscription of the entity they refer to. The lack of a one-to-one correspondence between 
taxonomic names and biological entities leads to costly errors and missed opportunities for 
anyone that wants to find all and only published research and data about a particular taxonomic 
group (Remsen 2016). A database built on matching names rather than underlying meanings will 
have uncontrolled variation in aggregation errors across taxonomic groups depending on their 
specific scientific histories (Franz and Sterner 2018). 
Our collective understanding of biodiversity is thus too fractious to be adequately 
grounded in a single substantive consensus view about the meaning of terms, whether it be a 
metaphysically realist or a contextual, epistemic one. Is the consensus principle still relevant, 
then, when circumstances dictate against selecting a single classificatory system for a body of 
data? 
We argue that the answer is yes, but the nature of the consensus proves to be quite 
different. Instead of attempting to formulate consensus principles regarding classificatory 
content, systematists in the Linnaean tradition have agreed on consensus principles for the 
coordination and communication of their dissensus. They have laid down methods for 
coordinating their disputes about the proper circumscriptions of taxa by formulating principles 
that help them identify when they are disagreeing about the boundaries of the same taxon and 
when they are drawing boundaries of different taxa differently. In other words, consensus 
principles in systematics provide consensus about the application of a name (i.e. its extension) 
even in the face of disagreement about its precise meaning. 
The semantics of a contemporary Linnaean taxonomic name can be analyzed into three 
main components for our purposes here. The name itself, as a sequence of letters, carries no 
content relevant to its semantic meaning, even if it superficially appears to describe a property of 
the taxonomic referrent. (We skip over other syntactic information provided in names alone, 
such as Latin suffixes indicating rank and the binomial genus-species structure of species 
names.) It is the pair of name plus a fixed name-bearing element of a taxonomic group – its so-
called “nomenclatural type” or “type” for short – that helps channel differences in hypotheses 
about its semantic content. The combination of name and type often fail to designate a unique 
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referent, and in practice biologists are often uncertain about the correct referent of a name due to 
partial or contradictory data. Yet, by designating types for names, it becomes possible to “fix the 
reference” of a taxonomic name without specifying its full taxonomic meaning. In other words, 
nomenclatural types provide anchor points for the objective application of names against a 
background of subjective differences in where boundaries between groups need to be drawn. 
Using the device of types, taxonomists can establish whether they disagree about the 
circumscription of the same taxon or numerically different taxa.  
For species names in particular, it is important for an author to make explicit what 
circumscription of organisms (or of lower-level taxonomic groups) it applies to, i.e. what kind of 
thing they take any individual species to be. Ideally, the specification of a circumscription should 
also make reference to the species concept it operationalizes, e.g. a biological (interbreeding) 
species concept or a phylogenetic species concept. We will refer to these circumscriptions as 
“taxonomic concepts,” following established usage in the literature. In theory, the type specimen 
can only belong to one biological species, so the combination of the type plus a species 
circumscription should be sufficient to specify the application of a name.  
Unlike the choice of a species concept, which given the current state of the species debate 
can be treated as somewhat arbitrary, taxonomic concepts have an empirical status as scientific 
hypotheses. To see this, consider the difference between  identifying what a given name refers to 
with and without specifying a taxonomic concept. It is easy and uncontentious to say, “This 
taxonomic name refers to the biological entity that includes this type specimen.” It is much 
harder epistemically to accurately identify and agree on which organisms other than the type 
specimen are also members of the designated species. In other words, even if we agree that there 
is a fact of the matter about the precise referent of the taxonomic name, there is still the 
epistemic challenge of correctly describing what that referent is. Taxonomic concepts can 
therefore be empirically accurate or inaccurate to varying degrees based on whether they include 
all and only the organisms that are actually part of the true referent. Even as the association 
between name and nomenclatural type remains fixed, then, it is legitimate and indeed desirable 
for biologists to revise or disagree about the correct taxonomic concept, especially as new traits 
and individuals are sampled.  
Taxonomists’ use of a method of ostensive reference fixing as a means of coordinating 
their comparisons of different descriptions has been a successful means to maintain a basic level 
of common knowledge about the semantic meaning of a term even as the precise nature of its 
referent remains disputed. As an early advocate of this method in botany put it succinctly, it has 
enabled taxonomists to “have a designation ready for the final entity, but also available for any 
number of approximating concepts which may follow each other with no unnecessary confusion” 
(Cook, 1898).  
The value of taxonomists’ approach to naming is therefore twofold. First, it enables 
systematists to designate a referent using ostension plus a supplementary description instead of 
an Aristotelian-style theoretical definition. Second, taxonomists can understand and share data 
classified under a name without having to agree on the name’s referent (if any). The diagnostic 
description that supplements the ostensive component of the definition allows biologists to 
represent the name’s meaning extensionally, i.e. as a set of organisms associated with the name. 
Along with supplementing the referential precision of the ostensive component, the descriptive 
component also provides operational criteria for determining which organisms belong under the 
name. A dissenting systematist can therefore represent a colleague’s definition in a purely 
extensional way and side-step the question of what taxonomic entity the name actually denotes. 
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A coordinative view of the consensus principle 
The principles and rules taxonomists rely on to share data without presupposing a 
consensus view of biodiversity have developed in circumstances very different from today’s 
data-intensive research environments. Is it possible to translate these historical practices into an 
effective computational system for data discovery and integration? We argue that this is possible, 
at least in principle, by adapting the standards for the valid publication and application of names 
that we have described above. The relevant version of the consensus principle for systematics is 
then a matter of sharing a system of reliably coordinating the use of terms, not agreement about 
what exactly those terms refer to: 
Coordinative Consensus Principle (CCP): The design of a formal 
classificatory system for expressing a body of data should be grounded in 
a consensus standard for coordinating the use of classificatory terms, even 
if the meanings of those terms haven’t been settled. 
Before we address the CCP in more detail, we should first briefly clarify how taxonomic 
classifications relate to bio-ontologies. At the highest level of abstraction, taxonomic 
classifications also express logically nested hierarchies of terms that can be modeled using 
description logic (and its various implementations, e.g. in OWL). As noted earlier, the NCBI 
taxonomy, for example, is represented by the NCBITaxonomy ontology, though it provides no 
definitions. Indeed, biologists and philosophers continue to dispute the metaphysical issue of 
whether taxonomic names should be interpreted as referring to kinds or individuals, and hence 
whether a class in description logic is properly interpreted as a kind with organisms as instances 
or an enduring individual with organisms as spatio-temporal parts. In addition, ontologies can 
contain multiple logical hierarchies using different kinds of relationships. The Gene Ontology, 
for example, is a network composed of three different class hierarchies describing kinds of 
cellular location, molecular functions, and biological processes (Ashburner et al. 2000; 
Consortium 2017).  
Moreover, we’ve seen that systematists use a combination of reference fixing devices 
(nomenclatural types) and hypotheses of the taxa that include them, at least for lower taxonomic 
ranks such as species, genera, and families. (A recent alternative to Linnaean classification, 
PhyloCode, uses ostensive, "node-pointing" definitions for all taxonomic names but in a different 
fashion that’s outside our scope here.) The norm for bio-ontologies, especially ontological 
realism, has been the opposite (Klein and Smith 2010). 
As with bio-ontologies, handling taxonomic names on a large scale without sacrificing 
performance requires researchers to explicitly state and formalize the logical relationships 
between names. Human experts are able to memorize the relevant classifications for a taxonomic 
group in order to disambiguate any polysemic name usages. They are similarly able to translate 
specimen identification back and forth between classifications based on an expert understanding 
of the logical and biological relationships between taxon definitions. Human non-experts and 
computers, however, typically lack the background knowledge to carry out this contextual 
disambiguation of taxonomic names. Automated ontology matching algorithms, for example, 
typically rely on similarity between the character strings of terms or their relationships to other 
terms in the class hierarchy. When we compare multiple taxonomic classifications for the same 
group, however, the issue is precisely that names are reused with different meanings and these 
meanings are revised to reflect alternative scientific hypotheses about the extensions of the taxa.
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 One approach is to align taxonomic concepts by representing their extensions spatially in 
a similar way to Venn diagrams (Franz and Peet 2009; Franz et al. 2015; Franz, Zhang, and Lee 
2017). Region Connection Calculus (RCC) provides a suitable set-theoretic vocabulary for 
human experts to express the logical relationships between the extensions of taxonomic names in 
an intelligible form for computational search and reasoning. Figure 1 illustrates a set of results 
for taxonomic concepts of North American grasses in the “Andropogon complex.” Franz et al. 
have used RCC-5, a version with five relationships: X is a subset of Y (X<Y), X contains the set 
Y (X>Y), X is congruent to Y (X==Y), X excludes Y (X ! Y), and X overlaps with Y (X><Y). 
In some cases these relations can be established deductively using the definitions of the 
taxonomic concepts. For example, if one name’s definition uses the same type specimen as 
another, then we know the extensions of both names must at least overlap (i.e. X not ! Y). In 
other cases, the relationship between two names is not immediately apparent from their 
definitions and the trained judgment of a taxonomic expert is necessary to interpret the authors’ 
intended semantics. Experts in each taxonomic group generally already know these semantic 
relationships implicitly, but expressing this knowledge is explicitly and in a machine-readable 
format requires substantive effort and scholarship.  
Using the CCP, systematists are therefore able to deliver high quality data discovery and 
integration through the logical alignment of conflicting systems, yet it neither invokes consensus 
about “settled” science, nor does it endorse the pure conceptualism that Smith and Ceusters 
oppose. First of all, note that systematists do not attempt to define “concept” in general. They 
make no claim that meaning is always extensional rather than intensional, or that one form of 
definition is inferior in general. Instead, they stipulate a consensus convention within their 
professional community regulating what is required for an acceptable definition. Moreover, 
taxonomists regularly take the ostensive component of taxonomic name definitions to involve 
reference to real taxa (though this realist interpretation is not itself stipulated by any 
nomenclatural code). For example, type specimens in species definitions establish theoretical 
facts of the matter about the referents of taxonomic names, against which taxonomic concept 
descriptions can be tested and revised for empirical accuracy. Since systematists often face 
uncertainty or disagreement about the true referent of a name, they use taxonomic concepts to 
stand in for the true referent. Taxonomic concepts in this regard can provide reasonably reliable 
representations of what biologists using that classification system take the referent to be  
There is an obvious cost to this approach when consensus is available: translating across 
data classification schemes requires intensive labor to produce and maintain the logical 
alignments. This effort is minimized when a single, universal classification for data is adequate 
for everyone involved. However, embracing the realist or best consensus approaches does not 
eliminate the need for alignment over time. As knowledge changes, the ability to translate 
historical data annotations (“legacy” data) into contemporary terms becomes valuable. In 
addition, bio-ontologies are not perfectly modular, so careful alignment is still often necessary to 
integrate data classified according to multiple overlapping ontologies. Finally, we have never 
been able to reliably predict just which aspects of existing knowledge will be overturned by 
future discoveries. Having well-developed approaches to translating data across fundamentally 
divergent terminologies may come in handy in the most unexpected places. 
 
Conclusion 
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 In Data-Centric Biology, Sabina Leonelli argues that “the real source of innovation in 
current biology is the attention paid to data handling and dissemination practices and the ways in 
which such practices mirror economic and political modes of interaction and decision making” 
(Leonelli 2016, 1). In its most productive forms, getting data to travel without losing their 
meaning “involves the use of computational tools to raise awareness of the conceptual, material, 
and institutional scaffolding required to package and interpret data, rather than hiding those 
aspects away” (Leonelli 2016, 171). We’ve advanced this broader project here by formulating 
three consensus-based principles that scientists have invoked to help settle matters of designing 
formal classificatory theories for scientific data: through metaphysical consensus about reality 
(RCP), contextual standards for best definitions (CBCP), and coordination conventions (CCP).  
We’ve also argued for the value of the coordination conventions systematists have 
developed for regulating the application of taxonomic names when neither metaphysical nor 
epistemic consensus is available. It is by virtue of being epistemically and metaphysically 
lightweight that coordinative consensus-building does not lead to a “dictated consensus” being 
forced upon users of taxonomic databases by the database architects. The coordination 
conventions method show that reliable data discovery and integration are possible even in 
situations that are far from consensus.  
 The existence of different versions of the consensus principle strengthens the value of 
taking an information science perspective on data discovery and integration. Since there are 
multiple approaches, each community of scientists has an ongoing need for informed 
deliberation about which option is best for their situation. We’ve seen that limiting the content 
ontologies to areas of consensus, either ontological or epistemic, is not a universal solution, but 
this opens up many new questions. We hope that one outcome of this paper will be to illustrate 
alternative paths to investigating classificatory theories for biological data that don’t center on 
consensus about the definitions of the phenomena. More generally, we suggest that the use of 
coordinating conventions can be a fruitful alternative means of ontology-building in domains of 
research for which there is a low degree of consensus about the metaphysical and epistemic 
status of the classificatory goods. 
We also need a better understanding of how scientists operationalize their regulative 
principles for ontology design in different areas of science and how scientists provide empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of these principles. It would be valuable to have a more 
comprehensive sense of how scientists employ the contextualist version of the consensus 
principle in different fields, for example. Designing an ontology is not unlike doing an 
experiment, in that published articles describing the result are usually post hoc rationalizations of 
what actually happpened and do not reliably describe the discovery process. Understanding how 
scientists design ontologies in practice is therefore an important locus for integrating historical, 
ethnographic, and philosophical methods. Important sources in this regard include public, online 
email lists, such as the OBO Foundry’s discussion forum we cited above, as well as 
conversations at community meetings.  
Another open question are the theoretical capabilities of different theories of reference to 
ensure the accumulation of scientific data over time. For example, what is the best way to 
combine ostensive and descriptive content in definitions to enable communication and reasoning 
despite fundamental disagreements or change of belief? Smith has suggested that definitions with 
ostensive content are generally less desirable compared to theoretical definitions using 
Aristotelian differentia, but this claim depends on a number of other presuppositions made by 
ontological realism that do not hold in general. Data discovery and integration offer a novel 
 16 
setting with great practical importance for exploring how theories of reference function in a 
dynamic context. Historical studies of continuity and discontinuity in scientific data and 
classificatory theories have a major role to play in that project. 
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1 Illustration of how logically aligning the extensions of classificatory terms allows search 
and reasoning services for data associated with specific names. Representations of the semantic 
relations between three classifications—Blomquist (1948), Hitchcock and Chase (1950), and 
Radford, Ahles, and Bell (1968)—utilizing the name A. virginicus (adopted from Franz, Chen, et 
al. 2016). a Tabular alignment of lowest-level taxonomic concepts; each horizontal row 
corresponds to a congruent lineage of taxonomic concepts labeled with di erent but (locally) 
valid names. b Directed acyclical graph alignment visualization (“meaning transition map”) of 
the three classi cations, as logically inferred with the Euler/X multi-taxonomy alignment toolkit 
(Franz et al. 2015; Franz, Chen, et al. 2016; Franz, Pier, et al. 2016). Taxonomic concept labels 
are abbreviated. Arrows symbolize inverse proper inclusion (<), whereas dashed lines indicate 
overlap (><). Regions with rounded corners symbolize congruent concept regions; whereas 
other regions with various (gray to white) shadings and either rectangular or octagonal shapes 
represent concepts unique to the respective input taxonomy (i.e., either 1948, 1950, or 1968). 
Additional annotations: = congruent concepts, identical names; +: unique concept, unique name; 
− unique concept, non-unique name; * (a and b): low-level concept lineage congruent with A. 
virginicus var. tenuispatheus sec. Blomquist (1948), as singled out in the main text  
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Table 1: The three consensus principles compared and contrasted. 
 
 Realist Contextual-Best Coordinative  
Grounds of 
consensus 
Metaphysical truth Epistemic agreement Communicative 
expediency 
Target of 
consensus 
Meanings of 
classificatory terms 
Meanings of 
classificatory terms 
Standard for defining 
classificatory terms 
Appropriate 
conditions 
High agreement about 
meanings and uses of 
classificatory terms 
Moderate agreement 
about meanings and 
uses of classificatory 
terms, respectively 
Low agreement about 
meanings of 
classificatory terms; 
high agreement about 
extensions of definitions 
 
 
